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I  .  
, -  O N  M A N A G IN G  V O L U N T E E R S : 
A b s e n c e  o f M o n e ta rv  C o m n e n s a ti o n  a d  i ts  Im n l i c a ti o n  o n  M a n a e i n e  V o l u n ta ry  , 
O re a n i s a ti o n s : T h e  T s s u e s  o f M o ti v a ti o n . C o n tro l  a n d  O w a n i s a ti o n a l  S tru c tu re  
D r Y o c h a n a n  A l tm a n  
1 . W h a t i s  th e  q u e s ti o n ?  
V o l u n ta ry  o rg a n i s a ti o n s  a re  a  fa s c i n a ti n g  h y b r i d  o f c o n tra d i c ti n g  te n s i o n s . T h e y  
c o m b i n e  w o rk  w i th  w h a t i s  e s s e n ti a l l y  a  l e i s u re  (n o n  w o rk )  p u rs u i t; p e o p l e  o ffe r i n g  
fre e  th e i r  ti m e , i d e a s  a n d  g o o d  w i l l  b u t o p e ra ti n g , n e c e s s a r i l y , w i th i n  th e  c o n fi n e s  o f 
a n  o rg a n i s a ti o n ; o rg a n i s a ti o n s  c re a ti n g  c a p i ta l , w e l fa re  a n d  c u l tu ra l  w e a l th  w h i c h , 
h o w e v e r. a re  n o t a c c o u n te d  fo r  i n  th e  n a ti o n ’s  G N P . l  
T h e re  a re  s o m e  q u e s ti o n s  a r i s i n g  fro m  th e s e  c o n tra d i c ti o n s  w h i c h  c a l l  to  ta s k  
m a n a g e rs  i n  v o l u n ta ry  o rg a n i s a ti o n s , a s  w e l l  a s  m a n a g e m e n t e d u c a to rs  a n d  
o rg a n i s a ti o n  th e o r i s ts . I w o u l d  l i k e  to  a d d re s s  h e re  o n e  k e y  a s p e c t - th e  l a c k  o f 
m o n e ta ry  c o m p e n s a ti o n  (s a l a r i e s , fe e s , p a y )  w h i c h  i s  i n h e re n t i n  a l l  v o l u n ta ry  w o rk  
a n d  i ts  i m p l i c a ti o n s  fo r  th e  i s s u e s  o f, w o rk  m o ti v a ti o n , c o n tro l  a n d  o rg a n i s a ti o n a l  
s tru c tu re . 
2 . O rg a n i s a ti o n a l  S tru c tu re  
I w i l l  s ta rt w i th  a  c o m m e n t o n  o rg a n i s a ti o n a l  s tru c tu re . 
F o r  s i m p l i c i ty  a n d  c o n v e n i e n c e , l e t u s  a s s u m e  th re e  fu n c ti o n s  i n  v o l u n ta ry  
o rg a n i s a ti o n s . 
T h e  B o a rd  -  w h o s e  ro l e  i t i s  to  c re a te  s tra te g y , d i c ta te  p o l i c y  a n d  p ro v i d e  th e  
l e g i ti m a c y  fo r  a n  o rg a n i s a ti o n ’s  o p e ra ti o n s . 
T h e  M a n a g e m e n t -’ w h o s e  ro l e  i t i s  to  e x e c u te  th e  B o a rd ’s  p o l i c y  a n d  ru n  th e  
o rg a n i s a ti o n  d a y  b y  d a y . 
T h e  W o rk e rs  - w h o  d o  a l l  th o s e  a c ti v i ti e s  a s  d i re c te d  b y  M a n a g e m e n t, u n d e r  th e  
a u s p i c e s  o f th e  B o a rd . 
1 H a n d y  (1 9 8 2 ) l a b e l s  i t “g i ft w o rk ” a n d  c l a s s i fi e s  th e  v o l u n ta ry  e c o n o m y  a a  a  m a j o r c o n s ti tu e n t o f th e  
i n fo rm a l  e c o n o m y . 
How do these three functions relate ? To examine that, I would like to describe the 
evolution of a typical voluntary organisation in which I became involved. 
It started as a parents organisation of mentally handicapped children, initiated by a 
group of concerned parents who came from a similar background and shared a 
common vision: to provide an educational framework of ex-curricular activities for 
their children, on top of existing provisions. 
To begin with, all three functions; Boaid - Management and Workers were fused, as 
all the three were filled by all those concerned. Consultations were informal, 
decisions were taken ad-hoc and work was shared according to need and ability. 
(Figure 1). 




A stage of fusion in all three functions: everybody is doing everything. All volunteers. 
Soon it became apparent that some professional guidance was needed and the parents 
sought the assistance of a professional youth worker. The appointee became a fee 
paid worker, accountable to the founding group and directed by them. He in turn 
was also expected to direct them on professional matters and general advice. 
Thus, although the stage of fusion in roles was still apparent, a structure began to 
emerge (figure 2). 
Figure 2: Second Stage in the Evolution of a Voluntary Organisation 
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At Stage 2, the Board has had to develop a clear set of instruments to monitor 
activities; and the fee paid worker, who filled a Management as well as a Worker 
function, reported to them on a monthly basis, in effect, by submiting pay claims. 
Relations were very informal, particularly as most Workers were also taking 
management decisions and quite a few of them constituted the Board. However, 
some formality was clearly inevitable because by that time the voluntary organisation 
assumed the status of a charity and had to accept financial and other scrutiny. 
Before not too long, activities expanded and so did the (voluntary) membership. 
Plans and aims expanded as well. On the other hand, fund raising became now a 
focused necessity. A full-time worker to manage all these was required. He was 
followed by a part-time (paid) assistant/secretary. By now our voluntary 
organisation assumed a clearly differentiated structure. 
Figure 3: Third stage in the evolution of a voluntary organisation 
At this stage a clear separation between the three junctions is apparent. Management 
is professional and paid. Board and Workers are volunteers. 
Differentiation at the third stage has taken the form of clear divisions between the 
three functions. The formulating of strategy, policy and key decisions were with the 
Board (composed entirely of volunteers) - as the organisation grew the need for a 
long time strategy developed and this had to follow with a detailed yearly plan 
countered by an appropriate budget. Management was by and large composed of 
professional Daid functionaries. Their role was to translate the Board’s decisions to 
activities, to report back to the Board and institute recommendations for future 
activities; and of course to manage the Workers, which by now became the size of a 
small army - all volunteers. 
Although the organisation evolved with the years, and some of its aims and principles 
have changed, the basic structure remained the same. It is still directed by 
volunteers (the Board) and most of the Workers are volunteers. Management, not 
untypically to mature voluntary organisations, is composed of professional paid 
workers and ‘sandwiched’ in the hierarchy between the (voluntary) Board and the 
(voluntary) Workers.2 
By now, our voluntary organisation has assumed a structure similar to any formal 
organisation, or has it? 
Although, on the surface, the mature voluntary organisation resembles in its structure 
any other formal organisation, there remains a core difference: two out of its three 
functions are not getting paid for their work - neither the Board nor the Workers are 
paid. Yet money is a cornerstone in organisational theory and practice. If we take 
money away, we are left with a lull in the organisational process, which requires 
some explaining. 
I would like to discuss the implications of the lack of money at two levels: first, at 
the interface between Management and Board and second, at the interface between 
Management and Workers. 
3. The Management - Board Interface 
Two aspects are common to the interface of Board vis-a-vis Management: First that 
Board members are not paid, while Management are. Secondly, that Board members 
normally work less (hours per week) than Management. 
This, however, is not limited to voluntary organisations. Voluntary or honorary 
unpaid Board membership is common to many public or even private organisations. 
Organisations will want to have persons with special skills, resource access or public 
relations profile on their Board; while individuals will want to be associated with 
significant institutions where they may make an impact. 
It is when no-one of the Board is in paid, full-time status - a situation common to 
many in voluntary organisations - that some characteristic vulnerability creeps in. 
2This is, of course, an abstraction. One can find different structures and combinations of voluntary/paid 
functions in voluntary organisations. Handy (1988) distinguishes five categories which can overlap. The 
above composition is discussed, because it highlights some of the “classical” issues facing voluntary 
organisations. 
I -  
.- 
Firstly, w e  a r e  l ikely to  s e e  a  g r a d u a l  reversa l  o f d e p e n d e n c y  re la t ionships.  W h i le in  
t radi t ional  o r g a n i s a tio n s  p o w e r  filte rs  d o w n  th e  h ierarchy,  h e r e  it is M a n a g e m e n t 
w h o  a r e  in  possess ion  o f th e  in format ion,  k n o w - h o w  a n d  tim e  to  d e v e l o p  strategy 
a n d  i m p l e m e n t pol icy. W h i le M a n a g e m e n t a r e  in  fu l l - t ime capacity,  B o a r d  m e m b e r s  
a r e  (vo luntary)  p a r t-tim e r s . B o a r d  m e m b e r s ’ te r m  o f o ffice  te n d s  to  b e  fixe d  a n d  its 
s ize ( m u c h  la rge r  th a n  in  commerc ia l  firms)  w o u l d  lim it e ffect ive c o m m u n i c a tio n  a n d  
dec is ion  p rocesses  ( U n te r m a n  a n d  Davis,  1 9 8 2  in  B o w m a n  a n d  Asch,  1 9 8 7 ) . If th e  
o p e r a tio n a l  s t ructure is such  th a t B o a r d  m e e t on ly  occas iona l ly  a n d  p a r ticu lar ly  if th e  
tu r n o v e r  o f B o a r d  is m o r e  rap id  th a n  M a n a g e m e n t, th e n , wi th tim e , M a n a g e m e n t wil l  
h a v e  to  ta k e  ove r  f rom B o a r d  s o m e  o f its fu n c tio n s . 
O r a  p o w e r  v a c u u m  m a y  d e v e l o p  in  wh ich  ne i ther  B o a r d  n o r  M a n a g e m e n t fee l  th e y  
h a v e  th e  m a n d a te  a n d  h e n c e  th e  responsib i l i ty  to  r u n  th e  bus iness.  As  a  result ,  
dec is ion  tak ing  m a y  b e c o m e  h a p h a z a r d  a n d  a  te n d e n c y  to  accep t h i g h e r  levels o f r isk 
th a n  just i f ied ( the  ‘risky shift’ p h e n o m e n o n : S to n e r , 1 9 6 8 ) .3  
I recal l  a  m a jor  U K  fu n d  ra is ing  charity, w h o s e  B o a r d  was  c o m p o s e d  o f s o m e  o f th e  
l e a d i n g  b u s i n e s s m e n  in  th is  c o u n try a n d  w h o s e  dec is ion  m a k i n g  p rocess  was  as  
desc r i bed  a b o v e . T h e  c o m m e n tary  f rom M a n a g e m e n t was  “th e y  ( the  B o a r d  m e m b e r s )  
w o u l d n ’t d a r e  m a n a g e  the i r  o w n  bus iness  l ike th a t”. 
A  c o m m o n  so lu t ion to  c o m b a t M a n a g e m e n t ‘ta k e  ove r’ o f B o a r d  fu n c tio n s  a r e  joint  
a d - h o c  c o m m i tte e s  c o m p o s e d  o f B o a r d  a n d  M a n a g e m e n t, w h o  m e e t f r e q u e n tly to  
ta k e  decis ions.  B u t in  such  a  f ramework  w h e r e  B o a r d  m e m b e r s  a r e  p u ttin g  in  th e  
tim e  a n d  e ffo r t r e q u i r e d , c o m p a r i s o n  with M a n a g e m e n t is inevi table:  “w e  work  h a r d  
fo r  f ree  a n d  th e y  g e t p a i d ” is th e  c o u n te r  comp la in t.4  
A n o th e r  o u tco m e  o f th e  shif t ing d e p e n d e n c y  re la t ions b e tween  B o a r d  a n d  
M a n a g e m e n t is th a t M a n a g e m e n t m a y  b e  te m p te d  to  a p p o i n t its ‘B o a r d ’ r a th e r  th a n  
th e  o th e r  way  r o u n d  ( G o u l d n e r , 1 9 6 3 ) . I h a v e  s e e n  it in  m o r e  th a n  o n e  o r g a n i s a tio n  
th a t M a n a g e m e n t is l ook ing  a r o u n d  to  p u s h  fo r w a r d  th e  cand idacy  o f a  s y m p a th e tic 
c h a i r m a n  w h o  h a p p e n s  to  b e  a n  ‘o ld  b o y ’. 
3Stoner  (1968)  found that there was  a  signi f icant tendency  for g roups  to g o  for re lat ively r isky decis ions.  O n e  
exp lanat ion  for this is the di f fusion of responsibi l i ty :  you  can  b l a m e  the g roup  (and  h e n c e  n o  o n e  in  
par t icu lar)  if th ings g o  wrong.  In Wi l son  k Rosenfe ld ,  1990.  However ,  a lso  a n  oppos i te  tendency,  to opt  for 
m o r e  conservat ive  dec is ions  was  found ( L a m m  a n d  Myers ,  1978) .  
4 ”T h e  pa id  staff of a  vo luntary  pro ject  asked  the Commi t tee  for a n  improved  m i l eage  a l lowance.  T h e  
Commi t tee  re jected the request  because  they d o  not  c la im a l lowances  for c o m i n g  to the Commi t tee”. ( f rom the 
H a n d y  Work ing  Party,  1 9 8 1  p.8). ( E m p h a s i s  not  in  the or ig inal ) .  
4. The Manaeement - Workers Interface 
Pay is a major constituent in organisational relations. Lack of pay poses some 
intriguing questions. These would be formulated as follows: 
How do you motivate and control people without paying them? 
4A Motivation 
Why work? Is a question that has occupied management theorists and practitioners 
ever since the dawn of the Industrial Revolution, when work was separated from 
non-work and became a regulated, managed activity. 
If one had the option, would one want to work? In other words, is work to be 
treated as a necessary evil and hence, externally driven; or is Man internally inclined 
to work and motivation is therefore an intrinsic matter. 
Not surprisingly, the answer to this question is a matter of opinion. McGregor5 
coined this Theory X and Theory Y, - “an abstraction or typology of the internal 
attitudes and assumptions about people held by a manager” (Schein 1989).6 The two 
belief models can be summarised as follows: while one view advocates that people 
have to be driven to work (Theory X), the other believes that “work is as natural as 
play or rest. The average human being does not inherently dislike work” (Theory Y: 
McGregor, 1960, ~47). 
See Table 1: Two basic assumptions concerning people and work 
Theory X 
Assumptions about People 
Theory Y 
Assumptions about People 
Most people . . . 
H Dislike work and want as 
little as possible to do 
n Dislike responsibility 
n Resist change 
Most people . . . 
H Enjoy and want 
meaningful work 
n Like responsibility 
n Will adapt to change 
50 McGregor, The Human Side of Enterprise, McGraw-Hill, 1960 
6An interview with E Schein, Organisational Dynamics, Autumn 1989, p.67 
.- 
.- 
fl Are indifferent to 
organizational goals 
n Are primarily motivated 
by money 
n Prefer to be directed 
n Are committed to 
meaningful 
organizational goals 
n Are primarily 
motivated by 
challenging work 
n Prefer self- 
direction 
One should emphasise here that these views have nothing whatsoever to do with 
voluntary or non-voluntary organisations. However, pay does conveniently 
camouflage the issue while lack of pay necessarily exposes it. If you pay a person 
YOU - as Management - can be in a position to standardise your expectations from 
him/her. Management can tell employees what to do, how to do it, etc. 
Things get more complicated when handling voluntary workers. While one can be 
excused for advocating a Theory X model in the goldmines of South Africa or the 
goulags of Soviet Russia, it would be difficult to defend the absence of a Theory Y 
approach to volunteers working with mentally handicapped children or geriatrics with 
Alzheimer disease. Yet, Theory X - the conventional management approach, is still 
very persuasive. I found it quite common in the voluntary sector. Management 
simply overlooks the lack of pay and manages as if pay has not been a missing 
component in the labour process. Management “tells” Workers what to do, it employs 
close supervision, it repudiates rather than rewards - and sometimes it works! because 
if that is what people come to expect, this is what they will be content with.7 
4B Control 
Pay does not only simplify the “why work”? question, it also simplifies another key 
aspect of organisation life- control. 
By rewarding monetarily Management has a clear, neat, easy-to-implement tool for 
rewarding differentially on effort, seniority or grade, by universalistic criteria. 
7 38% of UK voluntary sector chief executives preferred management style is authoritarian and the majority 
of UK health charities are predominantly authoritarian (Gerard, 1983). More often than not, conservation 
could imply a theory X approach. 
Pay has a most convincing case for supporting an organisation’s structure and what is 
intriguing about it is that it has both motivational as well as direct control properties. 
Herzberg, in one of the most influential models on human resource management8 
distinguishes between ‘two dynamics’ in managing people. One he calls Hygiene- 
Pain Avoidance - an outline of the necessary set up for a given job (unacceptable 
work conditions will cause dissatisfaction). The other dimension he calls Motivation- 
Growth and this is to do with what generates satisfaction (which is not the opposite 
of dissatisfaction). 
Pay is clearly a hygiene factor, even high pay - because in Herzberg’s view rewards 
as much as punishments, are external to the contents of a job. To ‘buy’ someone 
through high wages does not improve the quality of one’s job.g At the same time 
people regard pay (salary) as a motivating factor, as figure 4 demonstrates. No 
doubt, because money is directly associated with other motivating aspects such as 
acceptance/recognition and status. 
Money blurs yet another issue - the legitimacy of an organisation, any organisation. 
As’ salaried employees, people would rarely stop to question the legitimacy of the 
organisation employing them: is its practice sound? are its services (products) ethical? 
is its conduct right? 
But the lack of money throws the issue of legitimacy into the ring, since the absence 
of pay necessarily forces forward the questions of “what is it all about?” and “what 
are we doing here anyway?“. Volunteers will more easily assume responsibility for 
challenging such questions than are likely to do paid, salaried employees.1° 
Money, then, is an ideal controlling and regulating device. Management in voluntary 
organisations has to do without it. What can one do? 
The most common approach is, as you might expect, to replace pay with other 
controlling mechanisms. Let us examine some examples in-depth. 
8Harvard Business Review paper “One more time: how do you motivate employees?” sold 1.3 million copies 
(Management Newsletter, Vol. 4, No. 3, May 1991) 
Sthere,there 
10 Heginbotham (1986) laments this “tendency towards collectivism” (~14) to debate even minor policy 
decisions as a hurdle in efficient management in the voluntary sector. 
Figure 4 
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Factors characterlztng 1,753 events on the job that 
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Source: Frederick Her&erg, “One More Time: How Do You Motivate Employees?” Hat-m-d BK+WS Reci& 
January-February 1968, p. 57. With permission. Copyright 0 1967 by the President and Fellows of Harvard 
College; all rights reserved. 
5. Workinp Voluntarilv Without Pav - Some Institutional ExamDles 
There are numerous organisations in which people work without pay, usually in a 
voluntary capacity, for only a portion of their total working time and at specified 
periods during their career. 
Less commonly, though not rarely, organisations operate on the principle of lack of 
pay altogether, usually as an ideological stand. Members of those organisations will 
be expected to work in full employ without drawing a salary. While there are some 
notable temporary organisations in this mould (e.g. the Hippy communities of the 
196Os), among the more permanent institutions one can mention are religious orders 
of various kinds and utopian communities. It is of interest to try and delineate the 
principles that govern their operation and I shall do that by focusing on the 
experience of the Israeli Kibbutzim - socialist utopian communities, which have been 
in existence for the past eighty years.‘l 
Kibbutz members do not draw a pay for their work: anything earned goes into the 
communal purse and individuals are given fixed amounts of personal budgets, which 
in principle, are not related to performance. Yet Kibbutzim, as working-producing 
organisations and in common with other egalitarian communities of their kind, are 
renown for having extremely high productivity morale. While sustaining a traditional 
organisational structure comprised of professional Management, lay Workers and a 
separate Board (which is often the Kibbutz General Assembly, not unlike voluntary 
organisations). How do they do that? 
These following principles govern their operations. 
First, there is in existence a highly developed (though largely unwritten) code of 
practice, whereby members are exoected to behave according to set norms. A great 
deal of time and energy are put in debating these norms and deviation from them 
wiil trigger the exertion of social pressure. Since these are total communities - 
people not only work, but also live there with their families, such pressure is very 
effective. 
Second, there is tight control over entry and exist (i.e. who mertis to be a member). 
Even if born into the community, one cannot automatically assume membership. 
Outsiders will have to undergo severe testing as to their suitability and fit; on the 
other hand, while those who decide to leave would be encouraged to distance 
themselves and in the past were commonly branded as ‘traitors’. 
A strong boundary (differentiation) exists between the inside and outside. Inside the 
organisation all are equals and therefore pay is irrelevant. One works hard if that is 
the norm. The outside is fairly irrelevant anyway, because all efforts are 
concentrated on creating a harmonious community of equals - a ‘Garden of Eden’, 
sharply contrasting with the world outside. Hence a preference for work inside the 
community and self-sufficiency in services (e.g. education), in an attempt to tighten 
the boundaries between the inside and outside. 
1lKibbutzim are probably the most researched among utopian communities. The forthcoming analysis is not 
based on any particular publication and it incorporates- the author’s own experiences living on and working 
with Kibbutzim. 
The third mechanism employed is the emphasis on communally binding institutions 
and rituals. Traditionally, Kibbutz members would eat their meals in a communal 
dining hall, would opt for group based entertainment and invest much time and 
effort in group based processes (communal decision taking, discussion groups, team 
projects, etc.). 
In such circumstances, differential pay as a means of managing (controlling, 
regulating) work performance is unnecessary. Social control has taken over from 
managerial control. Motivation is effected by normative behaviour. 
To bring it back to our context, if you manage a voluntary organisation and can 
effect one or more of these three principles: A strong normative code of conduct, 
tight boundaries and binding traditions/rituals, then the problem that the absence of 
pay causes, can be overcome by substitution and without changing the established 
organisation structure and processes. 
6. Orpanizational Structure (Revisited) 
I opened with a comment on organizational structure and I would like to end with it. 
What I attempted to do is to discuss the implications lack of pay has on managing 
voluntary organizations of the traditional mould, as depicted in figure 3: a functional 
separation of roles between Board - Management and Workers. .Some remedial action 
was suggested, based on the experience of egalitarian communal organisations. 
What characterises this approach is the wish to substitute a missing component 
(pay) in the organisational structure with something else. Is there a totally 
different approach possible? Is there an alternative? 
I think there is. 
First, one needs a different set of institutional assumptions. Instead of a traditional 
3-tier hierarchy of control (as depicted in figure 3) an atomized structure is 
envisaged, based on project groups (or even individual groups) who are essentially 
self-supporting and self-managed. Each project group is a (mini) organisation by its 
own right, comprising of Board-Management-Workers functions. The one and only 
requirement is that what they do stays in line with the general organisation’s aims, 
philosophy and principles. 
An example may be in order. 
Within the framework of a UK charity whose aim was to support inner city 
communities in distress, a group of dental practitioners took it upon itself to provide 
free dental service to a deprived neighbourhood. 
The group initiated and owned the idea, managed the process and monitored its 
development. It recruited the volunteers (through personal contacts and via the 
professional press), it determined the precise nature and aims of its activities and 
eventually even developed its own fund raising arm. 
Management role was limited to back-up support: administering the voluntary rota, 
negotiating a lease agreement and financial aid with the local authority and assistance 
with accidental expenses. 
The working of this ‘organisation within organisation’ is portrayed in Figure 5. 
Fig. 5 Oreanisational Structure of an ‘Alternative’ Voluntarv Oreanisation 
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A “mini” organisation within the larger organisation has evolved, comprising all three 
functions: Board-Management-Workers, essentially self-governed and self-managed. 
with back up assistance from the parent organisation’s professional management and 
in consultation with the Board of the pareut organisation.12 
Note the resemblance in structure to stage 1 in the evolution of Voluntary 
Organisations. (Figure 1). A small group, focused activity, self-reliant. Professional 
management is there to support and guide, but as an external agent. 
Are there any drawbacks to that structure ? Depends on one’s point of view. The 
possible drawbacks from the larger organisation’s point of view are that this structure 
12Handy (1989) calls this a “federative” structure. 
has an inherent anarchistic potency.13 Before not too long, the mini-organisation 
may decide that it could do without the protective support and guidance of the 
parent organisation and will secede to form its own independence. 
But is that bad? 
c Altman, May 1991 
13Since it goes against the ingrained drive of an organisation to perpetuate (Gouldner, 1963) 
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